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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is common knowledge that the the European Union’s competences are of 
limited scope.2 One limitation is that th EU is not entitled to act in the field of 
substantive family law. Since private international law is not substantive, it 
would follow that EU institutions, acting within their competence, should not 
affect the national understanding of marriage or parentage, for example, as it 
concerns the origin of the child, filiation, and ancestry. Nonetheless, a detailed 
examination of some recent legislative measures initiated by the European 
Union in field of private international law—in EU terminology: “judicial 
cooperation in civil matters”3—shows that it could affect the substantive family 
laws of member states. These legislative measures are the subject of this article. 
It should be noted at the outset that in many EU Member States, the legal 
concept of parentage is understood, following biology, as maternity combined 
with paternity. Such an approach is recognized as a fundamental principle of 
law. Under Article 18 of Polish Constitution of 2007, “Marriage, being a union 
                                                 
1
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of a man and a woman, as well as the family, motherhood, and parentage, shall 
be placed under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland.”4  
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal stressed that:  
 
Marriage, being the union of a man and woman, has acquired a distinct constitu-
tional status within the domestic law of the Republic of Poland, on the basis of 
Article 18 of the Constitution. Any modification of this status would be possible 
only by the way of an amendment of the Constitution. Such a modification is neither 
possible by way of a ratified international agreement nor by EU secondary law.
5
 
 
The Polish Supreme Administrative Court clarified6 that Polish law doesn’t 
recognize the notion of “same-sex parents.” It does not provide for legitimate 
sanction of such a family unit. The Court stressed, inter alia, “The term ‘same-
sex parents’ constitutes contradictio in se, since—not only legally—a child 
cannot be conceived in the same-sex relationship,” and, “The consequence of 
the Polish legal system is the inability to recognize a female person [who did 
not give birth to the child]—or who by the nature of things is not a biological 
father—as a ‘father’ or even a second ‘parent.’” 
In the explanation of this decision it was added—significantly, for 
transnational situations—that the registration of two same-sex persons in a birth 
record would be not only contrary to the legal order in Poland, but could also 
mean certifying untruths by a public official.7 Similarly, in the ruling of the 
Supreme Administrative Court,8 it was emphasized that: “Polish family law 
does not recognize the institution of ‘same-sex parents’ or ‘surrogate mother’ 
and does not accept ‘surrogate maternity contracts’ that are invalid.” 
A similar principle as to the natural understanding of parentage is in force in 
many Member States of European Union, which are not international organi-
zations with uniform substantive family law.9 
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II. THE LIMITED COMPETENCE CONFERRED ON  
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The European Union has no competence to enact substantive family law, that 
is, to define generally the parentage and origin of a child (ancestry). Under 
Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union,10 expressing the fundamental 
Treaty principle of the conferred powers “1. In accordance with Article 5, 
competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States,” and “2. The Union shall respect the equality of Member States 
before the Treaties as well as their national identities … .” 
Additionally, according to Article 5, 
 
1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The 
use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
 
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States. 
  
Theoretically, European Union law could not lead to any modification of the 
domestic idea of marriage or parentage (for example, of the legal concept of the 
origin of the child). Given these principles, to speak of the “European Union’s 
family law,” as the literature sometimes does, is to misuse terminology. This 
phrase cannot precisely describe the current or proposed rules of substantive 
family law unified in Member States (for example, the Uniform Family Code 
issued by EU regulation), because such rules do not exist at present and may 
not function in the future. Nor could “European Union family law” be under-
stood to refer to the non-substantive rules of private international law11 or as a 
                                                 
10
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union arts. 4 & 5 
(June 7, 2016), 2016 O.J. (C 202) 13 [hereinafter TFEU]; European Union law is published 
at www.eur-lex.europa.eu 
11
 See Piotr Mostowik, Beginning of the Twenty-First Century—The Age of Common 
European Private International Law Has Commenced? Some Remarks from V4 Countries’ 
Point of View, in THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY IN V4 COUNTRIES 32 (Trnavska Univerzita v Trnave 2009); Piotr Mostowik 
& Monika Niedźwiedź, International Conventions Concluded by the European Union after 
the ECJ “Lugano II Opinion” of 2006: An Alternative or Complement to EU Regulations’ 
Path to Unification of Private International Law? 1 POLISH REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 9–53 
(2012). 
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description of proposed rules of a non-binding but doctrinal character 
(proposals de lege ferenda).12 
Separate issues are raised by the fact that the European Union is entitled to 
exercise competence in the field of private international law sensu largo, that 
is, including choice-of-laws principles and rules of international civil proce-
dure. In the European treaties, this branch of law is referred to as “measures of 
judicial cooperation in civil matters.”13 Generally speaking, the aim of private 
international law and civil procedure is to regulate which state’s courts are 
empowered to hear a case and render judgment (for example, in a case of 
filiation); which state’s substantive law should be applied (for example, to 
determine the origin of a child); and what consequences in one state result from 
decisions given in another (for example, concerning records of civil status). 
One of the classic solutions, included in the general part of this branch of law, 
is the public policy clause (Fr. orde public clause, Ger. Vorbehaltsklausel). 
Under this clause, another jurisdiction’s law can be not applied by the forum, 
and a foreign judgment may not be recognized in the forum, if the effect would 
be contrary to its public policy.14 
The EU regulations adopted on this legal ground are called “Brussels 
regulations” in the case of procedural rules15 and “Rome regulations” in the 
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case of choice-of-law rules,16 and generally prevail over domestic provisions.17 
They are not in force in Denmark because this state has not transferred its 
competence in the field of private international law to the European Union. The 
regulations are optional in the United Kingdom and Ireland, because of their 
special opt-in status. Some of these regulations were adopted during a process 
of enhanced cooperation between a group of Member States, and so they are in 
force only in limited parts of the European Union.18 
 
III. THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS  
OF FOREIGN REGISTRATION OF CIVIL STATUS REGISTRATION  
(ORIGIN OF THE CHILD, ADOPTION, MARRIAGE) 
 
A. The Proposed Green Paper of 2010 
 
A third legislative measure, the Green Paper of 2010, purportedly concerns the 
EU regulation on reducing bureaucracy.19 It contains several conclusions 
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relating to the identity of parents. Point 4.3, titled “Mutual Recognition of the 
Effects of Civil Status Records,” reads: 
 
This would mean that each Member State would accept and recognize, on the basis 
of mutual trust, the effects of a legal situation created in another Member State. In 
the examples mentioned above, the child’s name and the filiation should be recog-
nized by the authorities of the Member State of origin of that child, even if the 
application of that State’s law would have resulted in a different solution. … Harmo-
nization of the conflict-of-law rules might be another possible way of allowing 
citizens to exercise fully their right to freedom of movement while providing them 
with greater legal certainty in relation to civil status situations created in another 
Member State. … In principle, citizens in cross-border situations might be allowed 
to choose the law applicable to a civil status event. This possibility could satisfy the 
legitimate interests of citizens who, in making this choice, would express their 
attachment to their own culture and Member State of origin or to another Member 
State. 
 
B. The Declared Goal versus the Content of the EU  
Uniform Rules Proposed in the Green Paper of 2010 
 
Notably, some of the rules proposed by Commission raise doubts about 
understanding of marriage, paternity, and maternity. Many objections were 
raised by Member States and NGOs in comprehensive reviews during public 
consultation about the Green Paper of 2010.20  
First, although legislative initiatives at the EU level purport to be aimed at 
reducing bureaucracy and promoting the free movement of persons, some may 
have effects far beyond their declared purposes. They may, inter alia, affect the 
juridical expression of parentage. In particular, these initiatives include official 
recording of maternity and paternity, which is typically recorded as a part of 
civil status registration organized under the internal law of each Member 
State.21 
European Dignity Watch started its contribution with an accusation: 
 
                                                                                                                         
COM (2010) 747 final (Dec. 14, 2010), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ 
.do?uri=COM:2010:0747:FIN:EN:PDF 
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The Commission’s analysis is superficial and incomplete. It risks misinforming the 
debate. … However, there is reason for serious doubt with regard to the definition 
and analysis of the problems to which the Green Paper purports to present possible 
solutions. Indeed, the Commission’s analysis and understanding of these problems 
appears incomplete, simplistic, superficial, and, to some extent, misguided.
22
 
 
Also, the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences pointed out in its 
contribution that:  
 
Some of the options mentioned in the Green paper, in particular as for the mutual 
recognition of the effects of civil status records, call for an extremely careful 
approach, as they give rise to a number of legal and ethical concerns. Some of the 
documents involved are closely linked with matters of high sensitivity that stand at 
the core of the Member States’ national sovereignty, in areas in which ethical 
implications and national sensibilities and peculiarities come into play (e.g., 
marriage, civil/registered partnerships, adoption). We are concerned that some of the 
solutions suggested by the Green paper would devalue such national sensibilities 
and legal traditions (if not divest them of particular significance). The richness of 
Europe is also in its diversity. This diversity should be preserved and not questioned 
or crushed by levelling exercises at the EU level. Full respect for the diversity of 
national legal orders and for the different Constitutional traditions, as well as for the 
Member States’ public policies, should guide the EU actions on this matter.23 
 
C. Encroachment upon the Competence of Member States  
in Substantive Family Law 
 
In light of excerpts from the contributions concerning the Green Paper of 2010, 
the question of the competence of the European Union should be raised in the 
context of proposed legislative attempts. One of the solutions contemplated by 
the Commission in future regulation was recognition in the European Union of 
the substantive effects of foreign civil status registration.24 The German contri-
bution emphasized: 
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 European Dignity Watch, General Comment on the Green Paper 1–3, April 2011, 
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The question of whether, for example, a particular institution should be created in 
family law, how a family-law relationship is established or annulled, and what 
effects it produces is the subject of—often politically controversial—decisions by the 
legislature. As examples one might mention: the registered civil partnership or 
marriage of persons of the same sex, the filiation of a child in the case of a “surro-
gate mother,” the introduction of presumptions of filiation in favour of the mother’s 
registered female partner, [and] the admissibility and effects of adoption (full 
adoption, “partial” adoption, admissibility of adoption of adults, adoption by same-
sex couples, etc.). The EU has no legislative powers in this area. Neither can it 
therefore require a Member State’s legislature to place its family law at the disposal 
of the 25 other Member States without restriction, allowing the persons concerned to 
have a family-law relationship that exists under the law of another Member State to 
be registered in that State even though they have no close ties with that state’s legal 
order.
25
 
 
The Dutch contribution pointed out: 
 
In principle, the Netherlands welcomes the fact that the Commission has initiated a 
major consultation on how to remove obstacles encountered by citizens in the field 
of the law of persons and civil status in cross-border situations. … However, this 
does not necessarily imply that the EU should simply enact legislation, as such 
action must also satisfy the demands of proportionality and subsidiarity (Art. 5(1) 
TEU). The Netherlands believes that subsidiarity is the key principle in this context: 
Any issue that can be regulated more effectively by the member states should not be 
decided in Brussels. We accordingly welcome the Commission’s observation that 
the EU has no competence to intervene in the substantive family law of Member 
States, for example, as regards the attribution of surnames in the case of adoption 
and marriage. However, this does not alter the fact that the Netherlands will continue 
to push for the multilateral recognition of same-sex marriages and registered 
partnerships in the EU.
26
 
                                                                                                                         
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
PRIVATE AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS] 392–400 (2006); Rolf Wagner, Inhaltliche 
Anerkennung von Personenstandsurkunden—ein Patentrezept?—Überlegungen aus 
internationalprivatrechtlicher Sicht [Content Recognition of Civil Status Documents—A 
Patent Recipe?—Considerations from International Private Law Point of View], 18 PRAXIS 
DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
PRIVATE AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS] 609–15 (2011). 
25
 Germany, Federal Government Observations on the Commission Green Paper, “Less 
Bureaucracy for Citizens: Promoting Free Movement of Public Documents and Recogni-
tion of the Effects of Civil Status Records,” COM (2010) 747 final 10–11, www.ec.europa. 
eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/public_authorities/germany_minjust_en.pdf 
26
 The Netherlands, Dutch Response to Green Paper: “Less Bureaucracy for Citizens: 
Promoting Free Movement of Public Documents and Recognition of the Effects of Civil 
Status Records,” COM (2010) 747 final April, 2010 2–4, www.ec.europa.eu/justice/news 
room/civil/opinion/files/110510/public_authorities/netherlands_minjust_en.pdf 
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European Dignity Watch noted in its contribution: 
 
The automatic recognition of the legal effects of civil status records presupposes full 
convergence of the relevant national legislations. It is best left to Member States to 
decide whether or not they want to automatically recognise the effects of another 
Member State’s civil records. In some instances, this will be the case while in others 
it will not. … Where there is no full convergence of national legislation (as is 
notably the case with marriage, civil partnership, and adoption), the adoption of a 
principle of mutual recognition would clearly have bearing on substantive family 
law in the Member State that is asked to grant such recognition.
27
 
 
In addition to these arguments, a formal issue appeared. The EU Commis-
sion proposed to adopt the Green Paper of 2010, not in the proper legislative 
process requiring unanimity (that would not have been achievable)—a process 
that should be mandated in private international law in family matters. Instead, 
the EU Commission proposed to adopt the Green Paper in a procedure that 
required only the majority vote of Member States in the EU Council. The 
Commission explained that this instrument not only covered issues of evidence, 
that is, proving that a particular foreign registration took place, but also had a 
substantive effect concerning family matters. The consequence would be a 
general importing into each EU country the foreign concept of the marriage and 
parentage registered abroad. 
The German contribution emphasized that:  
 
If the legal act is concerned predominantly or exclusively with civil status docu-
ments or the matters documented therein, then it would in principle be subject to the 
decision-making procedure provided in the first subparagraph of Article 81(3) 
TFEU, since these are matters concerning family law.
28
  
 
Also, European Dignity Watch pointed out in its comment: 
 
For any measures or efforts aimed at legal harmonization that affect family law, 
Article 81.3 of the TFEU requires unanimity of all Member States. No EU law that 
entails a change of family law in a Member State can be passed by a simple majority 
but needs the consent of all 27 Member States.
29
 
 
The construction of recognition of substantive effects of foreign registration 
would de facto cause recognition of alien family law effects regarding the legal 
origin of a child. It would, for example, create the legal fiction of a child’s 
                                                 
27
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28
 Germany, supra note 25, at 1. 
29
 European Dignity Watch, supra note 22, at 2. 
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origin from persons of the same sex—for example, two men as the primary 
parents of a child (after adoption or as a result of a contract with a so-called 
surrogate mother), or two women as the primary parents (when the maternity of 
the one is legally registered due to marriage with the other, who gave birth to 
the child). Such an effect would be manifestly incompatible with the public 
policy (ordre public) of some of Member States.30 
 
IV. REJECTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSAL AND THE  
FINAL CONTENT OF THE EU REGULATION 
 
The Green Paper of 2010 met many critical voices coming from Member States 
and NGOs. For example, the above-mentioned German contribution was very 
negative: “The Federal Government therefore believes ‘automatic recognition’ 
to be the wrong approach, for all family-law relationships, without excep-
tion.”31 
Many critical remarks were presented in Dutch contribution, for example: 
 
On the face of it, applying automatic recognition to civil status matters seems like an 
attractive idea, but it is certainly not without problems. For example, it would mean 
that all Member States would in principle have to recognize adoptions, marriages, 
filiations, and recognitions carried out in other Member States, despite the fact that 
such matters are subject to significant cultural diversity between and differences in 
social attitudes within the Member States. … [T]he Netherlands can imagine, as 
suggested in the Green Paper, that it will ultimately be necessary to distinguish 
between different categories of legal facts relating to civil status. For example, 
automatic recognition might be appropriate in the case of the attribution or changing 
of surnames, which is mentioned in the Green Paper and is now the subject of ECJ 
case law that tends towards mutual recognition, and death. In the Netherlands’ view, 
however, it should not currently apply to adoptions, due to the many different 
safeguards that still surround intercountry adoption within the EU. The same applies 
to filiation and recognition.
32
 
                                                 
30 A general overview of this problem is precisely presented by Margaret Somerville, 
Children’s Human Rights to Natural Biological Origins and Family Structure, 1 INTL J. 
JURIS. FAM. 49–52 (2010). On the important reasons for desirable coexistence between 
natural (biological) and legal provisions, see Scott T. FitzGibbon, The Biological Basis for 
the Recognition of the Family, 3 INT’L J. JURIS. FAM. 1–36 (2012). 
31
 Germany, supra note 25, at 10–11.  
32
 The Netherlands, supra note 26, at 11. The German contribution was also very critical of 
the general presumptions announced by the EU Commission:  
The Federal Government would like to point out that the descriptions in the introduction to the 
Green Paper take a one-sided view, presenting any and every demand for evidence as an 
obstacle to the exercise of rights and prima facie unjustified. That is totally unrealistic and 
gives the regrettable impression that the Member States’ authorities and the legislation on 
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The Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences similarly recommended the 
rejection of: 
  
… the extreme solution of automatic recognition, as it would bring about legally and 
practically absurd results and unwanted/undesirable consequences, in particular as to 
the area of family law. First of all, the risk of marriage/partnership tourism is also all 
too evident: Couples who do not have access to marriage or civil/registered 
partnerships (this can be the case for opposite-sex and/or same-sex couples) in their 
own Member State would easily get round the perceived “obstacles” contained in 
the relevant national legislations by first entering into marriage or civil partnership 
in another Member State, where such types of unions do exist, and subsequently 
forcing their own Member State to recognise them, as well as their civil effects. 
Secondly, it is hard to see how Member States could be legitimately required to 
accept what according to their legal systems might be not acceptable and merely 
constitute an artificial construction created by other national legal orders—unless 
chaos is deemed to be a legitimate goal. In general, it is important to ensure that an 
initiative aimed at helping EU citizens does not have the direct or indirect effect of 
creating interference with the Member States’ family law systems and the relevant 
national competence, as well as with their options concerning the benefits deriving 
from civil status.
 33
 
 
On the other hand, the LGBTQ+ organizations, who are in the minority, 
expressed in the debate a positive assessment of the activities proposed by EU 
Commission. For example, the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and 
Intersex Association of Europe noticed that that only seven Member States 
provide same-sex partners the right to adopt and only eleven countries allow 
the non-biological same-sex partner to adopt a partner’s child.34 It also noted 
that: 
While respecting the principle of subsidiality [sic] the trend in Central and Eastern 
Europe should be taken into account by the Commission and directly addressed 
when formulating future initiatives on the recognition of the effects of civil 
                                                                                                                         
which their actions are based are condemned in advance. … Moreover, many of the fears 
expressed by the Commission seem exaggerated. It is doubtful whether the mere fact that a 
citizen has to provide evidence of a particular legal status to an authority of another Member 
State will seriously deter him from making long-term, life-changing decisions such as 
marriage or going to work in another Member State. The European Union (EU) should 
concern itself with aspects that are typical of cross-border matters and simply seek to remove 
the difficulties that the cross-border dimension entails. 
Germany, supra note 25, at 1. 
33
 Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community, supra note 23, at 
7–9. 
34
 ILGA-Europe, Contribution to the Green Paper, April 2011 22, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/organisations/ilga_en.pdf 
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documents. Otherwise it is highly probable that some of the Member States in 
question will use their domestic legislation to limit or nullify existing legal ties of 
same-sex couples as [well as] their children while within their national territory.
35
 
 
Commenting the Green Paper of 2010, this organization demanded that  
 
… respect for fundamental rights of LGBTI families must be ensured each time that 
rights and benefits are attached to family members for any given purpose. Under the 
present fragmentation, the division of competences within the EU, with its emphasis 
on national sovereignty over family matters, could even provide a favourable 
competitive environment. Neither Member States nor the European Union should 
feel uncomfortable with a system where EU citizens are allowed to make use of the 
law that best recognises their rights and to make these rights portable. … Parental 
links established in one Member State should be valid throughout the whole of the 
European Union without exception. Children should not see their parental ties and 
important relations of care stripped away from them simply on the basis of their 
birth status, or their parents’ sexual orientation or gender identity. 36 
 
The critical comments presented by the Member States and many who 
actively contributed to public consultation resulted in the significant reduction 
of the scope of the original proposals of the Commission. In the 2013 amended 
proposal,37 the scope of the regulation was limited to abolishing the legalization 
of certain documents and similar formal requirements. Article 15, paragraph 2, 
of the proposal noted that EU multilingual forms, which attest the content of 
civil status registration, do not have  a substantive effect on the legal recogni-
tion of their content in another member state. 
Finally, EU Regulation 2016/1191,38 adopted in July 2016, applies only to 
the formal aspects of the evidentiary value of foreign documents issued by 
registry offices. Its scope is limited in the manner just described. According to 
the Article 2, paragraph 4, “Regulation does not apply to the recognition in a 
                                                 
35
 Id. at 14. 
36
 Id. at 21, 36. A similar positive evaluation was presented by the Campaign Against 
Homophobia Poland, a Polish NGO, noted in its contribution (www.ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/organisations/poland_campaign_against_homophobia
_en.pdf) that “the person, that they [she or he] marry, would then also appear as a spouse in 
the unified EU civil status document and Polish authorities could no longer deny the fact 
that same sex unions exist” (at 1). This organization was “definitely in favor of full recogni-
tion of marriages and children’s status—adoption” (at 2). 
37
 European Commission, Proposal for Regulation of The European Parliament and of the 
Council on Promoting the Free Movement of Citizens and Businesses by Simplifying the 
Acceptance of Certain Public Documents in the European Union and Amending Regulation 
(EU) No 1024/2012, COM (2013) 228 final. 
38
 Commission Regulation 2016/1191, 2016 J.O. (L 200) 1. 
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member state legal effects related to the contents of official documents issued 
by the authorities of another Member State.”39 
Adoption of the legislative plans announced by the Commission in 2010 
would de facto have affected fundamental principles of personal and family law 
in most Member States. The changes, which would have been unwelcome in 
many Member States, included rejecting the definition of a child’s origin and 
parenthood in terms of motherhood and fatherhood, as well as rejection of the 
concept of marriage as the union between a man and a woman. These 
provisions would have had substantive effects contrary to public policy of some 
Member States. 
 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
 
Although the legislative initiative represented by the proposed EU Commission 
Green Paper of 2010 purported to aim at “reducing bureaucracy” and “promot-
ing the free movement of persons,” it would have gone far beyond these 
declared purposes. In particular, this initiative included extraterritorial effects 
of official registration of a child’s origin and parentage, which is information 
typically contained in civil status records currently organized under the internal 
law of each Member State. One of the solutions contemplated by the EU Com-
mission was the principle of recognition of the substantive effects of foreign 
civil status registration. Its result would have been a general importing into one 
EU country of a foreign concept of parentage or filiation from a second state, 
where the maternity or paternity of the child was registered. The Member State 
would have had to accept the substantive effects of foreign registration, without 
control nor influence on the scope of actual circumstances in which the 
registration of civil status takes place, for example, in a case of the paternity of 
two men and no woman.40 The uniform solutions considered in Green Paper of 
2010 raised doubts in many Member States about how parentage was to be 
understood.  
                                                 
39
 The proposed 2013 content of art. 15 ¶ 2 of was omitted in the final text of the regulation, 
probably because it was redundant to the chapter on multilingual forms provided by the 
general part of the regulation. 
40
 The foreign state administration can in fact register anything that reflects its understand-
ing of civil status. In some situations, that would be evaluated as excessive exercise of 
powers in relation to foreign citizens. For example, foreign law governing the organization 
of civil status registration and its competences may provide an opportunity to register on the 
formal grounds of the temporary residence or citizenship of one of the future spouses, 
regardless of habitual residence. 
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For this reason, some excerpts of the Green Paper of 2010 raised the ques-
tion of the competence of the European Union. Importantly, despite the lack of 
European Union’s competence to regulate substantive family law, which was 
confirmed in official documents accompanying these initiatives, the solutions 
proposed by the EU institutions could lead in many Member States to a change 
in fundamental domestic legal principles. The greatest concerns are raised by 
provisions that, despite the lack of EU competences in field of family law, in 
practice not only amend private international law, but also cause unwelcome 
changes to substantive rules of family law. 
The EU Commission in the Green Paper of 2010 contained serious inaccura-
cies and contradictions. For example, point 4.3 read:  
 
It is important to stress that the EU has no competence to intervene in the sub-
stantive family law of member states. Therefore, the Commission has neither the 
power nor the intention to propose the drafting of substantive European rules … to 
modify the national definition of marriage. The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union does not provide any legal base for applying such a solution. 
 
Despite this clear statement of the law, it was proposed inconsistently on the 
same page of the document: “Several solutions could be considered to ensure 
recognition of the effects of a civil status record or legal situation connected 
with civil status created in a Member State other than the one in which it is 
invoked.” 41 
In conclusion, Member States need to make a detailed investigation into the 
effects of the instruments drafted by EU institutions. This is especially the case 
with proposals and legislative activities that are conducted other than through 
                                                 
41
 Inaccurate expressions were also presented by the EU Commission as regards the notion 
of marriage during another legislative procedure, i.e., in Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee and the Committee of the Regions, Bringing Legal Clarity to Property Rights for 
International Couples, COM (2011) 125 final. Some fragments of this document are inter-
nally contradictory, e.g., “marriage is a long-established institution that exists in all 27 
Member States” is contradicted in the next sentence: “[M]arriage may be open to 
opposite-sex couples or to same-sex couples” (p. 6). Precisely and honestly speaking, the 
“long-established institution of marriage in all Member States” may not be characterized as 
“open to same-sex couples.” See Piotr Mostowik, The Questionable Impact of EU Regula-
tions No 2016/1103 and 2016/1104 on the Identity of Marriage in a Member State, 
PROBLEMY PRAWA PRYWATNEGO MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO [PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW] (forthcoming, 2018), a paper presented at the conference on “Marriage—
Its Identity and Legal Recognition,” September 29–30, 2016, Warsaw University, organized 
by the Ordo Iuris Institute (www.ordoiuris.pl/en). See also Piotr Fiedorczyk, Attempts at 
Redefining the Family in Contemporary Polish Law, 3 INT’L J. JURIS. FAM. 357 (2012). 
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procedures requiring unanimity in the Council, as well as with matters that 
cannot be considered EU judicial cooperation in family matters. A precise 
examination of drafts, in particular, is justified by the need to protect consti-
tutional juridical expression of parentage in a Member State. Reviewing EU 
legislative measures, having in mind the difference between official expla-
nations concerning family matters and practical potential effects, leads to the 
conclusion that Member States should trust in general but examine the details 
as a reasonable approach. 
Such an approach is justified also by the fact that at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, family law, including maternity and paternity, varies in the 
world, and not only in the ordinary way that differences between domestic laws 
have always occurred. Current differences between legal systems relate to the 
foundations of family law and to the initial general assumptions of this branch 
of law, that is, that it imitates nature (the principle of naturam imitatur) rather 
than imposing solutions that contradict biology. This principle has always been 
a pattern for family law. Differences of the magnitude seen in current changes 
to family law are not comparable with those we have known in the past. Some 
legal systems differ in their legal concepts of marriage and the origin of the 
child on an unprecedented scale, unknown in the entire previous development 
of the law, to judge from sources dating from the last seven or eight thousand 
years.42 European Dignity Watch accurately observed: 
 
The situation is significantly different for documents relating to marriage, civil 
partnership, adoption and (due to major discrepancies in material law regarding 
artificial procreation) birth certificates. These documents refer to matters in which 
considerable differences exist between the legal systems of different Member States. 
This means that considerable differences of legal effect also exist between the 
documents concerned, some of which may produce effects under the law of one 
Member State that are considered undesirable—or even illegal or adverse to the 
public order—in another Member State. … 
In the same vein, there are considerable differences in Member States’ legislation 
on adoption, with some Member States allowing (and others prohibiting) the 
adoption of children by unmarried persons or same-sex couples. In these areas, 
therefore, the mutual recognition of civil status documents cannot be automatic but 
must be subject to the receiving Member State’s own policy approach.  
In this context, it should also be observed that less than one hundred years ago, 
the convergence of the legislative situation regarding marriage, divorce, and 
adoption was much greater than it is today.
43
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Finally, the motto of the European Union of Member States, announced at 
the session of the European Parliament in 2000, is once again worth recalling: 
United in diversity (In varietate concordia). In essence, this calls for a more 
cautious approach by EU institutions to drafting provisions that might consti-
tute unwelcome interference in the family law principles of the Member States 
that retain legislative competence in this area. Family law is firmly rooted in 
local societies, as well as domestic fundamental constitutional and moral 
systems. Legal systems differ widely. For example, in some states family law 
still reflects nature and biology, while others have changed that approach and 
created—from biological point of view—the artificial legal concept of same-
sex parents. This final conclusion is reflected also in the preamble to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union: “The Union contributes to 
the preservation and to the development of [its] common values while 
respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe 
as well as the national identities of the Member States.” 44 
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